The Relationship of Freedom to the Acquisition, Possession, and Exercise of Virtue :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

ABSTRACT There argon three park objections that any broadly Aristotelian legality theoriser must(prenominal) face, thus far as he or she holds that acts must be performed from a steadfast and stable longing in order to express virtue, and that virtue is in some way a applaudable fulfillment of human potential. individually of these objections accuses the virtuous person of not amply exercising his or her moderateness and freedom, and thus of being somehow less(prenominal) than fully human. There are three common objections that any broadly Aristotelian virtue theorist must face, insofar as he or she holds that acts must be performed from a firm and stable disposition in order to be called acts expressing virtue, and that virtue is in some way a praiseworthy fulfillment of human potential. Each of these objections accuse the virtuous person of not fully exercising his or her rationality and freedom, and thus of being somehow less than fully human. The first objection is th at acts flowing from the firm and stable disposition of virtue need not be expressions of rationality and freedom, since they may be performed by rote.The back up objection, related to the first, has to do with the voluntariness of the possession of virtue. Those who hold that the virtues must be firm and stable dispositions generally hold that a skilful upbringing from childhood is of utmost enormousness in the acquisition of such(prenominal) dispositions. The second objection is thus as follows if a persons virtue depends upon her upbringing, indeed she is not responsible for her virtue it was not up to her and she deserves no praise. The first objection, then, is that particular acts from a firm disposition of virtue are not fully rational or free the second objection is that the acquisition of the dispositions themselves is not fully rational or free, since it depends upon upbringing. If uncomplete the possession nor the exercise of virtue need be rational and free, then it seems that the activity of virtue is less than fully human, and thus cannot be the praiseworthy fulfillment of our human potential.The third objection, like the second, also has to do with the importance of ones upbringing to the virtuous life, but is a daub more pointed. Those who present the third objection argue that the acquisition of virtue, inasmuch as it requires such a directive upbringing, itself constitutes a limitation of ones freedom.